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RESEARCH ARTICLE

Attitudes Toward Jews Among Muslim Youths in Germany: The Diverging Roles of German, Origin, and Religious Identification

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Abstract Hostilities toward Jews threaten Jewish life and social cohesion in Germany and beyond. Because antisemitic worldviews are difficult to change once established, it is essential to study the correlates of anti-Jewish attitudes during adolescence, when education can still counteract them. Muslim youths in Germany are a particularly relevant group to study, as their attitudes are shaped by contexts with varying antisemitism norms, namely their religion, their origin, and the German host society. Using survey data collected in 2013–2017 from 1600 students in ten ethnoreligiously diverse German schools, we examine how social identifications relate to Muslim youths' attitudes toward Jews. Results show that Muslim youths hold significantly more negative attitudes than their Christian and nonreligious peers, partly explained by origin effects. Yet about half of the difference remains unexplained by demographic, socioeconomic, or cultural capital factors. Further, we demonstrate that different types of identification play diverging roles among Muslim youths: While identification with Germany relates to more positive attitudes toward Jews, identification with their country of origin or with Islam is associated with more negative attitudes. Religious practice is also associated with more negative attitudes. When all identifications are modeled simultaneously, however, only German and religious identifications are statistically significant. These findings suggest that social identifications may shape attitudes in different ways: National identification can buffer against antisemitism where societal norms condemn it, and identification with contexts without such norms can reinforce it.

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Einstellungen gegenüber Juden unter muslimischen Jugendlichen in Deutschland: Die unterschiedlichen Rollen von deutscher, ethnischer und religiöser Identifikation

Zusammenfassung Feindseligkeiten gegenüber Juden bedrohen das Leben von Juden und den gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhalt in Deutschland. Die Zusammenhänge mit antijüdischen Einstellungen im Jugendalter zu verstehen ist wichtig, um deren Verfestigung entgegenwirken zu können. Muslimische Jugendliche sind hierbei eine besonders relevante Gruppe, da ihre Einstellungen häufig von unterschiedlichen Normen in Bezug auf Antisemitismus geprägt werden. Anhand von zwischen 2013 und 2017 erhobenen Umfragedaten von mehr als 1600 Schülern an zehn ethnisch und religiös diversen Schulen untersuchen wir, wie soziale Identifikationen mit den Einstellungen muslimischer Jugendlicher gegenüber Juden zusammenhängen. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass muslimische Jugendliche deutlich negativere Einstellungen haben als christliche und nichtreligiöse Jugendliche. Dies lässt sich zwar teilweise durch Herkunftseffekte erklären, jedoch bleibt etwa die Hälfte des Unterschieds auch bei Berücksichtigung demografischer, sozioökonomischer und kultureller Faktoren ungeklärt. Verschiedene Formen der Identifikation spielen bei muslimischen Jugendlichen zudem unterschiedliche Rollen: Während die Identifikation mit Deutschland mit positiveren Einstellungen gegenüber Juden zusammenhängt, geht die Identifikation mit dem Herkunftsland oder mit dem Islam mit negativeren Einstellungen einher. Die Ausübung der Religion ist ebenfalls mit negativeren Einstellungen verbunden. Werden alle Identifikationen gleichzeitig modelliert, ist nur der Zusammenhang mit Identifikationen mit Deutschland und Religion statistisch signifikant. Diese Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass soziale Identifikationen Einstellungen auf unterschiedliche Weise prägen können: Nationale Identifikation kann Antisemitismus dämmen, wenn gesellschaftliche Normen ihn verurteilen, während die Identifikation mit Kontexten ohne solche Normen ihn verstärken kann.

Schlüsselwörter Soziale Identifikation · Religion · Islam · Antisemitismus · Jugendalter · Integration

1 Introduction

Antisemitism and anti-Jewish sentiments are global and escalating threats to Jews, who face hostility, exclusion, and physical violence across the globe (Cohen 2025; Enstad 2025). In Germany, as in other Western societies, hate crime data show high numbers of antisemitic incidents (RIAS 2024), and antisemitic beliefs are prevalent in surveys (Zick et al. 2017), experiments (Lutter et al. 2026), and social media (Binstok et al. 2024; Schwarz-Friesel 2019; Soemer et al. 2026). Moreover, there are growing public concerns about antisemitic bullying and hostility among

adolescents, with qualitative research indicating that antisemitic language and acts are widespread among school-aged youths (Bernstein et al. 2022; Chernivsky and Lorenz 2020; Colombo et al. 2024; Braband et al. 2025).

Such behavior is likely reflected in negative attitudes toward Jews as a collective. Thus, while most research on antisemitism focuses on conspiracy narratives or negative stereotypes, our interest lies in direct measures of negative attitudes toward Jews. Examining such anti-Jewish sentiments in younger age groups is important because adolescence is a particularly formative period in life (Alwin and Krosnick 1991). While it is hard to combat anti-Jewish hostility among adults, the right kind of education can reduce such views (Hinz et al. 2024; Nyhan et al. 2024; Firestone et al. 2026) and lead to greater tolerance in general (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Velásquez and Eger 2022). Thus, understanding anti-Jewish views among the youth in ethnically diverse schools is crucial for civic education. In such multicultural contexts, religious and national identities are particularly relevant in this regard. Adolescent peer networks are structured in part along religious and ethnic lines (Leszczensky and Pink 2025), so understanding how these identity dimensions are associated with anti-Jewish sentiment among youths is essential.

Existing studies indicate that antisemitic and anti-Jewish attitudes tend to be less common among younger people and adolescents compared to the older population (Friedrich and Storz 2022; Papendick et al. 2023; Fischer and Wetzels 2024). But there is important variation. For example, Fischer and Wetzels (2024) report that about 5% of nonreligious and Christian but almost a fifth of Muslim students in Germany hold antisemitic views. Similarly, Verkuyten and Thijs (2010) found that, in the Netherlands, Muslim adolescents, particularly those with high religious identification, had rather negative feelings toward Jews. These patterns mirror findings from previous research on the broader population, which showed that antisemitic conspiracies are relatively common among some minority groups, particularly Muslims and migrants from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and Turkey (Czymara et al. 2025; Jikeli 2015; Liebig 2023; Öztürk and Pickel 2021). This is even true in the context of higher education: Studies on university students' attitudes after the October 7 terror attacks in Israel by Hamas show that, although antisemitism is generally less prevalent among university students than in the overall population, it is significantly stronger among Muslim students compared to Christian students or those without religious affiliation (Hinz et al. 2024, 2025).

This has implications for research on youths. High immigration rates have created increasing ethnic and religious diversity in Europe in general and in Germany in particular (Eurostat 2025). This is especially true for the younger population, with 42% of those younger than 20 years in Germany having a migration background (Mediendienst Integration 2025). Increasingly, students originating from countries with different cultural heritages, family experiences, and religious orientations attend schools in Germany, making them an important case for the study of anti-Jewish sentiments.

The families of Muslim students often come from contexts in which anti-Jewish conspiracy theories are widespread and often politically instrumentalized (Nyhan and Zeitzoff 2018), potentially shaping attitudes passed from generation to generation. Moreover, many migrant and minority students have complex *social identifications*

relating to their host country, origin, or religion, all of which can affect their attitude formation (Fleischmann et al. 2019). On the one hand, youths may develop a *national identification*, which captures a sense of belonging to their country of residence (Germany in the present case),[1] where many of them were born and raised (Verkuyten and Martinovic 2012). On the other hand, youths from families with a migration history may form or retain an *origin identification* relating to their own or their parents' or even their grandparents' countries of origin (Umaña-Taylor et al. 2014). Finally, for many Muslim youths, *religious identification* is an important aspect of their lives, with Muslim youths exhibiting higher levels than their non-Muslim peers in Western contexts (Simsek et al. 2019). Their religion is often strongly connected with migrants' origins and forms a central element of the culture that migrant parents aim to transmit to their children (Phalet et al. 2018; Verkuyten and Thijs 2010).

This study examines the connection between social identifications and anti-Jewish attitudes among Muslim youths based on survey data from over 1600 youths in ten religiously diverse secondary schools in Germany (Leszczensky et al. 2022). Our results show that Muslim youths, on average, view Jews more negatively than their Christian or nonreligious counterparts do. Origin effects explain a substantial part of these differences between religions. Yet about half of the differences in attitudes cannot be explained by demographic, economic, or cultural characteristics. Moreover, we find that Muslim youths who identify more strongly with Germany are more positive about Jews, whereas those who identify more with their country of origin are more negative. Similarly, Muslims' religious identification and religious practice both correlate with more negative attitudes toward Jews. When all identifications are considered simultaneously, German and religious identification remain statistically significant, whereas origin identification and religious practice do not (because both strongly correlate with religious identification). Thus, different identifications connect to attitudes toward Jews in different ways. This indicates that identification with a country can buffer against antisemitism when referring to contexts in which norms usually condemn antisemitism but can boost antisemitism when such norms are weak(er). Some identifications thus have the potential to counteract anti-Jewish sentiments threatening Jewish life and social cohesion at large.

2 Attitudes Toward Jews Among Muslims in Germany

2.1 Religious and Historical Roots of Attitudes Toward Jews

Anti-Jewish attitudes are a key element of antisemitism, which more broadly refers to a conspiratorial worldview built on stereotypes and myths that cast Jews in a sinister light, what Adorno (1954) called the "rumor about the Jews." While the concrete definition of antisemitism is subject to scientific and public debate (Schmidt et al. 2011; Ullrich et al. 2024), a negative evaluation of Jews, which we analyze in this paper, is a clear component of antisemitism in all definitions.

[1] Because this study is set in Germany, we use the terms national identification and German identification interchangeably here, both referring to the host nation.

Antisemitism in Germany has an obvious connection to the Shoah, the industrial mass murder of Jewish life in Europe. While the antisemitism that developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was mostly a secular and nationalist movement, the antisemitic propaganda of the Nazis also drew upon long-standing stereotypes that were perpetuated by the Christian church (Munson 2018). After the Shoah, Germany's official relationship with Jews involved significant efforts to confront its Nazi past, including Holocaust education. However, antisemitism did not vanish from German society (Enstad 2026). Rather, anti-Jewish attitudes persist in both East and West Germany (Bergmann et al. 2024; Voigtländer and Voth 2015; Zick et al. 2017), particularly among the far right (Decker et al. 2022, 2024).

Islamic anti-Judaism has religious as well as historical roots. For centuries, Jews were considered dhimmis in the Muslim world, which implied fewer rights and additional taxes but also legal protection (Küntzel 2020) and less persecution compared to Europe at the time. During the Second World War, Nazi Germany distributed its antisemitic propaganda in printed form and through radio throughout the Arab world (Herf 2009; Küntzel 2005), intending to appeal to Arabs and Muslims to rise against Britain and join the Axis powers. Moreover, Nazi Germany collaborated at various points with several Arab leaders, some of whom viewed Germany as an ally against the British colonizers (Herf 2014). There were pogroms against Jews living in the Arab world before the establishment of Israel, such as the Farhud in Iraq in 1941, during which at least 180 Iraqi Jews were murdered (Black 2010). More recently, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict evokes feelings of injustice for many Muslims in contemporary societies and serves as a symbol of Western dominance in global politics (Zhirkov et al. 2014), which can affect attitudes toward Jews as a collective, though holding Jews collectively responsible is itself a form of antisemitism (Schmidt et al. 2011). Today, some Muslim leaders employ antisemitic tropes (Öneren-Özbek 2024), which further contribute to anti-Jewish sentiments in contemporary societies.

Together, these aspects explain why antisemitic views and conspiracies are relatively widespread among Muslims in both Europe (Czymara et al. 2025; Jikeli 2015; Meuleman et al. 2025; Fischer and Wetzels 2025) and the MENA region (Nyhan and Zeitzoff 2018; Weinberg 2020). Antisemitic conspiracies encompass negative feelings toward Jews as a collective, but the two concepts are not equivalent (Ozer et al. 2025). While antisemitic beliefs represent a rather cognitive dimension of ideology, feelings toward Jews concern a more affective dimension and are particularly likely to shape behavior. Studying attitudes directly is thus important because doing so captures negative views and because feelings of social distance are drivers of everyday intergroup behavior. Evidence from Germany (Katz 2026) and the Netherlands (Verkuyten and Thijs 2010) indicates that the share of adolescents with negative feelings toward Jews is significantly higher among Muslims than among Christians or the nonreligious. Our first goal lies in explaining which factors explain these differences. To this end, we consider demographic, socioeconomic, cultural, and identificational characteristics. First, origin effects relating to antisemitic sentiments in migrants' or their parents' countries of birth (Nyhan and Zeitzoff 2018; Weinberg 2020) may account for the gap in antisemitism between Muslims and other groups. That is, youths from families originating in regions where antisemitic norms are more widespread may internalize these views through early socialization or through

transnational ties that keep such narratives salient (Min et al. 2012). These mechanisms are not limited to direct transmission from parents but may also operate through co-ethnic networks, media consumption, or ethnoreligious institutions that reproduce origin-country discourses. Second, socioeconomic status can reduce negative attitudes toward Jews because it shapes adolescents' exposure to education and social norms, which, in turn, often increase critical thinking skills and cosmopolitan values and reduce prejudice more broadly (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Nyhan et al. 2024; Velásquez and Eger 2022). Third, social identifications and religious practice may explain differences in attitudes toward Jews, as we elaborate in detail below. Thus, we will try to explain the differences in attitudes between the religious groups by these factors.

2.2 Social Identifications and Muslim Youths' Attitudes Toward Jews

Social identity theory posits that individuals derive part of their self-concept from the social groups they belong to, which, in turn, shapes how they see themselves and others (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Based on this reasoning, social identity development theory argues that group evaluations among children and youths depend on how strongly children identify with their in-group, the in-group's norms and beliefs, and whether the out-group is seen as a threat (Nesdale 2008). Although Jews are a very small and hardly visible minority, antisemitic norms can lead children to adopt and reproduce hostile views of Jews (Verkuyten and Thijs 2010).

In modern societies, people are members of multiple categories and groups in a society and therefore have multiple social identifications (Fleischmann et al. 2019). This especially applies to youths from ethnic and religious minority groups. In this study, we focus on three types of identification that are particularly relevant in the context of Muslim migrants in Germany: *German identification* (referring to the host country), *origin identification* (referring to the country of origin), and *religious identification* (referring to religious affiliation).

2.2.1 Identification with Germany and Origin Countries

Identification with Germany plays a particularly interesting role for the attitudes of (children of) Muslim immigrants in Germany toward Jews. Nationalistic sentiment and antisemitism are key elements of German far-right ideology (Decker et al. 2022), and so one could expect (strong) identification with Germany to be associated with more negative views of Jews similarly among German natives and ethnoreligious minorities. However, in response to the mass murder of European Jews, the open expression of antisemitism became taboo in Germany after the Shoah. Learning about Nazi atrocities and the Holocaust is an integral part of German education and the Holocaust is a compulsory subject in German schools. As such, migrants whose families have no personal connection to the Nazi era might not associate Germany with antisemitism but rather with a liberal democracy putting efforts into protecting Jewish life. High identification with such a conception of Germany should then lead to more positive attitudes toward Jews among German Muslims. Katz (2026) argues that the culture of remembrance in postwar Germany creates a "bright cultural

boundary" that defines who belongs to the German nation. Accordingly, Muslims who identify with Germany may be particularly likely to signal this by expressing pro-Jewish attitudes. Finally, stronger identification with Germany generally signals higher levels of social integration among immigrant-origin youths (Fleischmann and Phalet 2018; Leszczensky et al. 2020). Thus, German identification may also reflect a greater willingness or motivation to align with the perceived societal mainstream in Germany, which, at least officially, rejects antisemitism. In line with this argument, Katz (2026) has shown that identification with Germany predicts more positive views of Jews among Muslim youths.

However, we argue that the effects of identification with a country fundamentally depend on the norms that are attached to it. The uniqueness of the Holocaust and Germany's culture of remembrance that has emerged from it imply that negative attitudes toward Jews are mostly taboo in German mainstream society. This differs for other contexts and countries, and likely for the country of origin of many Muslims and their children. As argued above, Muslim youths may internalize and reproduce antisemitic beliefs from within parts of their community. Verkuyten and Thijs (2010) write that "for some Muslims, the Jews form a 'negative other'" (p. 32). Thus, while antisemitism and anti-Jewish attitudes are by no means limited to Muslim groups, origin norms may contribute to higher levels of negative attitudes among them. In the context of this study, *origin identification* for migrants from Muslim-majority countries often implies a connection to contexts in which antisemitic ideas are relatively widespread (Nyhan and Zeitzoff 2018; Weinberg 2020) and in which youths rarely learn about the Shoah at school (Negev and Pardo 2024). Thus, we hypothesize that identification with these origin countries has the opposite effect of identification with Germany:

- Hypothesis 1: Higher origin identification is associated with more negative attitudes among Muslim youths.

2.2.2 Religious Identification and Religious Practice

Religiosity, particularly in a fundamentalist form, plays a key role in explaining antisemitism among religious groups. Several studies have shown that religious fundamentalism strongly increases antisemitism (Jikeli 2015; Öztürk and Pickel 2021; Fischer and Wetzels 2025) and hostilities toward several out-groups, including Jews (Koopmans 2015; Kanol 2021). Although the effect of fundamentalism applies rather universally across religions, including to Christianity, fundamentalism in Europe is most widespread among Muslims (Koopmans 2015). However, antisemitic attitudes are not only driven by fundamentalism but also correlate with high levels of religiosity in general (Czymara et al. 2025). We argue that religious identification plays a similar role among Muslims in Europe. As argued above, even though Jews are a very small minority, antisemitic norms circulating within communities can lead some Muslim youths to adopt and reproduce negative views of Jews nonetheless. Accordingly, Verkuyten and Thijs (2010) showed that anti-Jewish sentiment was particularly widespread among young Dutch Muslims who strongly identified with

their religion. In light of these patterns, we assume that this is similar for German Muslim youths and formulate the following hypothesis:

- Hypothesis 2a: Higher religious identification is associated with more negative attitudes among Muslim youths.

Closely related to religious identification and religiosity is religious practice, such as praying or attending religious services. Muslims who more often exercise their religion may be particularly prone to the religious form of anti-Judaism described above. Moreover, religious practice has a social dimension for many Muslims, and in social contexts in which anti-Jewish views are commonly voiced, individuals may gradually internalize or conform to such norms. Since antisemitism remains relatively widespread in many Muslim communities (Nyhan and Zeitzoff 2018; Öztürk and Pickel 2021), we hypothesize that both dimensions of religious practice, praying and mosque attendance, are associated with more negative attitudes toward Jews:

- Hypothesis 2b: Praying is associated with more negative attitudes among Muslim youths.
- Hypothesis 2c: Mosque attendance is associated with more negative attitudes among Muslim youths.

3 Data

We analyzed data from the *Friendship and Identity in School* (FIS) study (Leszczensky et al. 2022). The FIS study surveyed students in ten religiously diverse secondary schools in North Rhine-Westphalia, the most populous federal German state, across six waves from 2013 to 2017. Four schools were lower secondary, three were intermediate secondary, and three were comprehensive schools. The ten schools comprised an average of nine classrooms (range: 6–13) and 174 students (range: 74–282) per school, with an average of 33% of students identifying as Muslim (range: 7–51%). In the first wave, students were surveyed in the fifth, sixth, and seventh grades and were 11–12, 12–13, and 13–14 years old, respectively. Students filled out paper-and-pencil questionnaires in class, supervised by researchers and teachers. They were surveyed for up to six waves, with subsequent waves being about 9 months apart. Further details on the sampling and data collection procedure are provided by Leszczensky et al. (2022).

3.1 Measures

Attitudes Toward Jews Our dependent variable is based on the question "How much do you like these groups?" Respondents could indicate how much they (dis)liked Jews and other ethnic and religious groups, ranging from 1 "Not at all" to 5 "Very much."

Religion Students could indicate whether they were Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, other, or did not belong to any religion. We recoded these affiliations to differentiate

between Muslims (31.3% after listwise deletion), Christians (54.9%), and students with no religious affiliation (13.8%). We excluded the students from other religious groups (less than 3% of the sample).

German Identification German identification was measured by a mean index of four items: "It bothers me if somebody speaks ill about Germany," "Germany is dear to me," "I feel strongly attached to Germans," and "I feel like I am part of Germany," each measured on a five-point scale, with higher values indicating greater agreement. Prestudies suggest that these national identification measures achieve measurement equivalence for German and ethnic minority students and are highly reliable, with Cronbach's alpha greater than 0.8 (Leszczensky and Gräbs Santiago 2015).

Origin Identification Students who were born abroad or who had parents or grandparents born abroad were asked to write down the country of origin of the family. Origin identification was then measured by a mean index of the same four items used for the German identification measure but referring to the country of origin of the family instead. This measure, too, was intensively tested and shown to be reliable (Leszczensky and Gräbs Santiago 2015).

Religious Identification Religious identification was, again, measured by a mean index of four items: "My religion is an important part of me," "It bothers me if somebody speaks ill about my religion," "My religion is dear to me," and "I feel like I am part of my religion," each measured on a five-point scale, with higher values indicating greater agreement.

Frequency of Praying Students who indicated a religious affiliation were asked how often they prayed, with the answer categories of "Never," "A few times a year," "At least once a month," "At least once a week," "One to four times a day," and "Five times a day and more." We assigned students without religious affiliation the value "Never."

Religious Service Attendance Students with a religious affiliation were asked how often they attended a place of religious worship, such as a mosque or church. The answer categories were "Never," "A few times a year," "At least once a month," "At least once a week," and "Every day." Again, we assigned students without religious affiliation the value "Never."

Country of Origin To account for confounding origin effects, we distinguished four national contexts: *Turkey* ($n = 385$; 23.8% of the sample), which is by far the most frequent country of origin of German Muslims; the broader *MENA* ($n = 98$; 6.0%), which includes Muslim-majority countries such as Afghanistan, Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria; *Europe* ($n = 1052$; 64.9% of the sample), which includes all

Table 1 Descriptive statistics for the complete pooled sample and for Muslims only

	Complete sample ($n = 1621$)		Muslims ($n = 507$)	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Attitudes toward Jews (1–5)	3.01	1.23	2.54	1.29
Country of origin				
Europe	64.9%	–	11.4%	–
Turkey	23.8%	–	71.6%	–
MENA	6.0%	–	15.4%	–
Other	5.3%	–	1.6%	–
Gender				
Boy	47.7%	–	50.5%	–
Girl	52.3%	–	49.5%	–
Age	14.1	1.10	14.0	1.12
SES (ISEI, 16–90)	40.6	17.4	35.1	16.2
Number of books (1–6)	2.99	1.33	2.63	1.17
German identification (0–4)	1.98	0.90	1.72	0.83
Origin identification (0–4)	–	–	3.48	0.55
Religious identification (0–4)	–	–	3.66	0.48
Frequency of praying (1–6)	–	–	3.81	1.49
Mosque attendance (1–5)	–	–	3.15	1.06

SD standard deviation, *MENA* Middle East and North Africa, *SES* socioeconomic status, *ISEI* International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status

European countries except for Turkey and includes Germany[2]; and *other* ($n = 86$; 5.3% of the sample), which includes the rest of the world. The assignment is based on students' own, their parents', and their grandparents' countries of birth and thus covers up to three generations. For example, the country of origin of the family of a German-born child with German-born parents and Turkish-born grandparents would be Turkey.

Socioeconomic Status Socioeconomic status was measured using the International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI; Ganzeboom et al., 1992), running from 16 (least prestigious) through 90 (most prestigious). Students were asked for their parents' occupation; their answers were coded according to the ISEI conventions and averaged across both parents.

Number of Books As a proxy for cultural capital, students were asked about the number of books in their household. Answer categories were "0–10," "11–25," "26–100," "101–200," "201–500," and "more than 500."

[2] We did not use Germany as a separate category because there were no Muslim youths with no migration history in the family in the data; 14% of the Muslims in the sample belong to the first, 83.2% to the second, and 2.8% to the third migrant generation.

Gender and Age We calculated students' age at the time of each wave based on their self-reported year and month of birth. For gender, students indicated whether they were male or female.

Table 1 summarizes all variables, first, for the full sample of analysis (including Muslim, Christian, and nonreligious youths) and, second, for our Muslim sample only.

3.2 Analytic Strategy

Our analysis proceeded in four steps. In the first step, we established differences in attitudes toward Jews among Muslim, Christian, and nonreligious youths. Next, we sought to explain Muslim youths' attitudes toward Jews based on the characteristics discussed above. For this purpose, we estimated a series of regression models for youths across all religious groups, subsequently adding explanatory factors and focusing on whether these factors reduced differences between Muslim and non-Muslim youths in their attitudes toward Jews. Model 1 (M1) includes religious affiliation only, model 2 (M2) adds demographic variables (family country of origin, gender, and age), model 3 (M3) adds socioeconomic status and number of books, model 4 (M4) adds German identification, and model 5 (M5) adds frequency of praying.[3] Any remaining gap in anti-Jewish attitudes after controlling for these variables is likely rooted in religion-specific causes.

In the third step, we focused on Muslim youths only, estimating separate regression models to identify how German, origin, and religious identification, as well as frequency of praying and mosque attendance, relate to the attitudes of Muslim youths toward Jews. These analyses thus address our hypotheses.

In the fourth step, we estimated a joint model including German identification, origin identification, religious identification, and religious practice. We did so to assess which associations are stable when controlling for the other identification and religiosity variables. However, we do not regard this joint model as the most suitable test of our individual hypotheses, as the different identification types and religious practices are conceptually and empirically strongly connected. More importantly, several of them are plausibly mediators of one another rather than confounding variables (Elwert 2013). For example, religious identification is one of the causes of religious practice, as youths who identify strongly as Muslims pray more often and go to the mosque more frequently, so holding praying and mosque attendance constant blocks part of the effect of religious identification. Similarly, identifying with Germany may weaken identification with the country of origin, so the joint model underestimates the total effect of German identification. In short, including all these variables simultaneously risks overcontrol bias rather than reducing bias (Kohler et al. 2024). For this reason, we treat the separate models as the appropriate test of our hypotheses and read the joint model as a descriptive assessment of which associations are distinct from one another and which ones overlap.

[3] We used frequency of praying instead of religious identification because it provides more variation, especially for Muslim youth (Leszczensky and Pink 2017).

In all model specifications, we employed linear regression models with robust standard errors and school fixed effects to account for the nesting of students in schools. Because we are interested in time-stable differences across groups, we pooled all waves by averaging students' values across all available time periods to create a single cross-sectional value per respondent.[4]

4 Results

4.1 Attitudes of Muslim, Christian, and Nonreligious Youths Toward Jews

We start by comparing attitudes toward Jews among Muslim, Christian, and nonreligious youths. For comparison, we also show attitudes toward Christians and Muslims. Figure 1 displays the mean attitudes by religion in the pooled sample across all waves. On average, Muslim youths viewed Jews more negatively than both Christian and nonreligious youths did. In fact, of all the displayed attitudes, only the attitudes of Muslim youths toward Jews are below the neither-nor midpoint of the scale, thus indicating an overall negative attitude. In contrast, Christian and nonreligious youths held neutral attitudes toward Jews.

Figure 1 also indicates that the gap between attitudes toward Jews and other religious groups is most pronounced for Muslim youths, although it should be noted that this also reflects their highly positive view of the Muslim in-group. Finally, Christian and nonreligious youths displayed similar, but less pronounced, attitudinal patterns. Both groups tended to be most positive toward Christians, less favorable toward Muslims, and least favorable toward Jews. Yet the differences are least pronounced among nonreligious youths, who rated Muslims 0.5 point lower than Christians, followed by Christian youths, who rated Muslims 0.9 point lower than their Christian in-group. Muslim youths, on the other hand, rated Jews more than 2.2 points lower than their Muslim in-group. In the following, we will try to empirically explain this relationship.

4.2 Explaining Muslim Youths' Attitudes Toward Jews

Why do Muslim youths view Jews more negatively than their Christian and nonreligious peers do? To answer this question, we estimated a series of pooled ordinary least squares models. Figure 2 displays all coefficients. The full results are shown in Table 2 in the appendix.

Model 1 replicates the Muslim gap in attitudes toward Jews, showing that they view Jews almost 0.7 scale point more negatively than Christian youths do, which is

[4] In the present case, pooling the data has several advantages over the use of panel models. Most importantly, it enables us to estimate differences in time-stable characteristics that are a crucial part of our research question (i.e., between Muslim and non-Muslim youths). Moreover, within-person estimators for time-varying characteristics would limit our conclusions to youths whose identification or religious practice *actually* changes and, thus, would ignore stable strong identifications or pronounced religious practices, even though such effects should be most important from a theoretical point of view. We return to this in the discussion.

substantial for a five-point scale. This difference corresponds to approximately 0.57 standard deviation of attitudes toward Jews and is thus substantial in magnitude. The model also confirms that Christian and nonreligious youths do not differ significantly in their attitudes toward Jews.

Model 2 adds sociodemographic controls, namely family origin, gender, and age. Accounting for these variables reduces the Muslim coefficient by about half, which primarily reflects the strong association with country of origin. Yet the difference remains statistically significant and substantial in size. Model 3 further adds economic and cultural capital. This further slightly reduces but does not substantially diminish the Muslim coefficient. The same applies to M4 and M5, which, respectively, add German identification and frequency of praying.

In sum, controlling for demographics, socioeconomic status, cultural capital, German identification, and frequency of praying explains the Muslim coefficient to a considerable degree. However, considering all these factors still does not fully explain Muslim youths' more negative attitudes toward Jews.

4.3 Social Identifications and Muslim Youths' Attitudes Toward Jews

Our previous models cannot fully explain Muslim youths' more negative attitudes toward Jews. Moreover, our models so far are not indicative of what factors are associated with Muslim youths' attitudes toward Jews. To test our hypotheses, we thus estimated models for *Muslim* youths only. As stated above, we considered German identification, origin identification, religious identification, and religious practice separately to have a clearly defined estimate and to avoid overcontrol bias (Kohler et al. 2024). For each identification predictor, we ran two models: The first included the respective identification type alone, and the second added the control variables.




Fig. 1 Mean attitudes toward Jews, Muslims, and Christians by religious affiliation, based on the pooled sample




Fig. 2 Explaining Muslim youths' attitudes toward Jews. *ref* reference, *MENA* Middle East and North Africa, *SES* socioeconomic status, *ISEI* International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status, *M* model

4.3.1 The Role of Origin and German Identification

Figure 3 shows that Muslim youths who identify more strongly with *Germany* have more *positive* views about Jews (lower panel), whereas those who identify more strongly with their *origin* country hold more *negative* views (upper panel). Both patterns hold when sociodemographics, socioeconomic status, and number of books are controlled for, as shown in the full regression tables in Tables 3 and 4 in the appendix. A one-point increase on the German identification scale is associated with approximately a 0.25-point increase in attitudes toward Jews (out of five points, $p < 0.001$), and a one-point increase in origin identification is associated with a 0.3 decrease. In standardized terms, a one-standard-deviation difference in German and origin identification corresponds to approximately 0.16 and 0.13 standard deviations of attitudes toward Jews, respectively. This confirms our first hypothesis and emphasizes the importance of the normative context that a national identification refers to.

The full models in Tables 3 and 4 in the appendix show that, in contrast to the model on the full sample shown in Fig. 2, we observe a significantly negative coefficient of MENA origin among Muslim youths only, which is also true for those of Turkish origin. Similar to the prior model, we do not see any differences by socioeconomic status. Because these associations are largely the same in all identification models, we do not show them in these plots.




Fig. 3 Contrasting roles of origin and German identifications for Muslim youths' attitudes toward Jews. *M* model

4.3.2 The Roles of Religious Identification, Frequency of Praying, and Mosque Attendance

The model specification for religious identification (hypothesis 2a), frequency of praying (hypothesis 2b), and mosque attendance (hypothesis 2c) is analogous to the ones for origin and German identification described above. Figure 4 summarizes all associations; the full regression tables are in Tables 5, 6, and 7 in the appendix.

Figure 4 shows the associations for religious identification (left), frequency of praying (middle), and mosque attendance (right), all of which we hypothesized to be related to more negative attitudes toward Jews. The figure supports all three hypotheses, most clearly for religious identification but also for both measures of religious practice. Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c are thus all supported. Comparing the




Fig. 4 The role of religious identification, frequency of praying, and mosque attendance for Muslim youths' attitudes toward Jews. *M* model




Fig. 5 Full model including German, origin, and religious identification as well as religious practice (including controls)

different types of identification, we observe the strongest unstandardized coefficient for religious identification (–0.47, $p < 0.001$), which is almost twice as large as the association of German identification shown in Fig. 3. In substantive terms, the associations are modest: A one-standard-deviation increase in religious identification, frequency of praying, and mosque attendance is associated with approximately 0.17, 0.10, and 0.12 standard deviations more negative attitudes toward Jews, respectively.

4.3.3 Joint Model Including German, Origin, and Religious Identification

Finally, we assessed the connection between the identification types and attitudes toward Jews when accounting for the respective other sources of identification. For this purpose, we estimated a joint model for Muslim youths that included all identification and religious practice variables simultaneously as well as all controls (Table 8 in the appendix). This model allows us to assess which associations remain when the different identification and religiosity measures are considered simultaneously. Variance inflation factors ranged from 1.08 to 2.30, indicating some expected overlap among conceptually related predictors but no evidence of problematic multicollinearity. Yet, because this overlap implies removing part of the theoretically relevant predictive power of the individual variables we are interested in, we treat this joint model with some caution and view it as a more descriptive assessment of which associations are most strongly associated with attitudes toward Jews when all are considered jointly.

Comparing all identification types in one model in Fig. 5 indicates that the coefficient of Muslim youths' German identification remains positive and statistically significant, whereas origin identification weakens and stays negative but is no longer

statistically different from zero. Thus, while origin identification has a stronger connection to attitudes toward Jews compared to German identification when considered separately, German identification seems to trump origin identification when all identification types are considered jointly.

Religious identification continues to be significantly negatively related to attitudes toward Jews, even when German and origin identification are controlled for. In substantive terms, both remaining associations are modest: A one-standard-deviation increase in German identification and religious identification is associated with approximately 0.17 standard deviation more positive and 0.14 standard deviation more negative attitudes toward Jews, respectively. Frequency of praying and mosque attendance, on the other hand, are not significant when accounting for each other and all types of identification. Further assessing the correlations between the different identifications and religious practices reveals that this is because origin identification and both measures of religious practice correlate strongly with religious identification, which is why accounting for religious identification removes their association. In contrast, German identification is largely unrelated to both origin and religious identification as well as religious practices and hence also remains significant when the other factors are taken into account, whereas origin identification is no longer significant because part of its effect is explained away by religious identification. (Figure 6 in the appendix shows all correlations.) As outlined previously, however, these results should not be read as replacing the hypothesis tests reported above. Because religious practice and origin identification are strongly related to religious identification, entering all measures simultaneously removes shared variance that is substantively meaningful rather than confounding.

5 Discussion

Anti-Jewish hostilities remain one of the most persistent and consequential forms of group-based hostility in Europe and globally, with a significant rise in recent times (Cohen 2025; Enstad 2025; Gruber et al. 2024). Although these developments concern all of society, prior research has suggested that such views are, on average, particularly prevalent among Muslims (Czymara et al. 2025; Jikeli 2015; Liebig 2023; Öztürk and Pickel 2021). While established antisemitic worldviews are difficult to change among adults (Voigtländer and Voth 2015), the right kind of education can help reduce such views among the youth (Hinz et al. 2025; Lutter et al. 2025; Nyhan et al. 2024; Cheema 2026; Firestone et al. 2026). Against this backdrop, it is important for both scholarship and policy to understand the sources of negative attitudes toward Jews among younger generations of Muslims. To inform this debate, we analyzed the association between different types of social identification and attitudes toward Jews based on survey data from over 1600 youths in ten religiously diverse secondary schools in Germany (Leszczensky et al. 2022).

We found that Muslim youths expressed considerably more negative attitudes toward Jews than their Christian or nonreligious peers did. About half of these differences are explained by demographic and cultural factors, with country of origin accounting for a substantial part of these. Most Muslim youths in the sample are

of Turkish origin, which is associated with more negative views of Jews relative to the European-origin reference group, although this association should be interpreted cautiously given the small size of the European-origin reference group. Socioeconomic status is unrelated to Muslim youths' attitudes toward Jews in our data. By contrast, higher cultural capital, measured by the number of books in the household, is related to more positive views of Jews, and accounting for this further reduces the Muslim coefficient.

Importantly, however, even the combination of demographic, economic, and cultural factors as well as German identification and religiosity accounts for only half of Muslim youths' more negative attitudes toward Jews. This raises the question of what else explains Muslim youths' more negative attitudes toward Jews. Although the data underlying this study cannot answer this question, several plausible explanations exist. These include exposure to particular interpretations of Islam, which emphasize rather than counter anti-Jewish scriptures (Afridi 2023; Küntzel 2020). Another reason may be that negative attitudes toward Jews are empirically closely related to hostile attitudes toward Israel (Binstok et al. 2024; Schmidt et al. 2011; Kaplan and Small 2006), which are widespread among German Muslims (Öztürk and Pickel 2021).

Concerning the role of social identifications, we expected that German, origin, and religious identifications would shape attitudes toward Jews among Muslim youths, albeit in different ways. Our results indeed confirmed that Muslim youths' identifications are systematically associated with attitudes toward Jews. We first confirm Katz (2026) by showing that stronger identification with *Germany* corresponds to more *positive* views of Jews. However, we extend this by further demonstrating that Muslim youths' identification with their *country of origin* and with their *religion* both correspond to more *negative* attitudes toward Jews. Thus, different sources of identification relate to intergroup attitudes in different ways. The implication is that a stronger national identification may improve attitudes when it is connected to a context in which social norms reject open antisemitism and hostility toward Jews, as is the case in postwar Germany (Bergmann and Erb 1991). As a result, national belonging is associated with more positive sentiments toward Jews among Muslim students (Katz 2026). At the same time, it may reinforce anti-Jewish sentiments in contexts in which such norms are weak or nonexistent, as is the case in the origin countries of many German Muslims (Bali 2023; Litvak 2023; Nyhan and Zeitzoff 2018). Crucially, we thus show that the association between identification and attitudes appears to depend on the normative environment in which it is anchored.

Our study has several data-related limitations that could be addressed by future research. First, we captured attitudes toward Jews with a single item, which may limit validity and reliability. While negative attitudes toward Jews are a key aspect of antisemitism, they do not capture the conspiratorial component underlying antisemitic ideology, let alone differentiate between different types of antisemitism such as classical, secondary, or Israel-related antisemitism (Schmidt et al. 2011). As discussed above, data limitations also prevented us from testing what exactly explains the remaining gap between Muslim and non-Muslim youths that our variables do not account for, as our data contain no items on religious anti-Judaism or atti-

tudes toward Israel. Future researchers may want to measure religious anti-Judaism or attitudes toward Israel to test whether these aspects explain this gap. We also could not distinguish highly religious respondents from religious fundamentalists. Past research shows that fundamentalist Muslims are particularly negative toward out-groups in general and Jews in particular (Koopmans 2015) and that accounting for religious fundamentalism often renders mere religiosity statistically insignificant (Öztürk and Pickel 2021; Fischer and Wetzels 2025).

Finally, our study has limitations in scope. Our data were collected between 2013 and 2017, well before Hamas's October 7 attack and the subsequent war in Gaza. These developments further boosted the overall prevalence of anti-Jewish views, not only but particularly among Muslims, including in Germany (Demmrich et al. 2025). It is plausible that these developments also increased the association between Muslim group membership and identity and attitudes toward Israel and Jews, and our results should be understood as conservative estimates of the current situation. Moreover, it remains unclear how our findings translate to other contexts that are characterized by variation in norms and education. Future research should replicate our analysis with data collected after October 7, 2023, and examine how norm attachment and the identification with certain countries connect to attitudes toward Jews and potentially other historically persecuted minority groups, such as Kurds, Uyghurs, or Armenians.

These limitations notwithstanding, our study highlights the relevance of social identifications for understanding attitudes toward Jews among Muslim youths in Germany. However, neither personal identifications nor social norms are fixed. For example, while Christianity in Europe has long historical roots of violent persecution of Jews (Forger and Heschel 2023), the Catholic Church officially renounced anti-semitism in Nostra Aetate at the Second Vatican Council in 1965 (Treusch 2005). Although this does not imply that Christian antisemitism simply disappeared, such changing norms reduced the threat that institutionalized Christian antisemitism poses to Jewish life compared to earlier centuries and likely contributed to positive views among Christians toward Jews today. Thus, promoting such norms and increasing the visibility of reform movements within Muslim communities may help improve social cohesion in contemporary societies. Similarly, education programs tailored to combat antisemitism remain critical, particularly to improve intergroup relations among the next generations (Nyhan et al. 2024).

6 Appendix

Table 2 Full results for models estimating the attitudes of Muslim, Christian, and nonreligious youths toward Jews (pooled OLS with school fixed effects and robust standard errors)

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
Muslim (reference: Christian)	–0.661***	–0.374***	–0.285**	–0.261*	–0.262**
	(0.090)	(0.104)	(0.110)	(0.104)	(0.101)
No religion	0.067	0.102*	0.099*	0.114*	0.114^{+}
	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.049)	(0.061)
Turkey (reference: Europe)	–	–0.364**	–0.385**	–0.374**	–0.374**
	–	(0.138)	(0.132)	(0.131)	(0.132)
MENA	–	–0.199	–0.229	–0.242	–0.243
	–	(0.208)	(0.198)	(0.196)	(0.206)
Other	–	0.088	0.114	0.134	0.134
	–	(0.152)	(0.149)	(0.144)	(0.136)
Boy (reference: girl)	–	–0.188**	–0.193**	–0.200**	–0.200**
	–	(0.070)	(0.068)	(0.070)	(0.069)
Age	–	0.072*	0.073*	0.076**	0.076**
	–	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
SES (ISEI)	–	–	0.001	0.001	0.001
	–	–	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Number of books	–	–	0.137***	0.135***	0.135***
	–	–	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)
German identification	–	–	–	0.072*	0.072*
	–	–	–	(0.034)	(0.034)
Frequency of praying	–	–	–	–	0.000
	–	–	–	–	(0.028)
Number of observations	1621	1621	1621	1621	1621
R^2	0.109	0.122	0.144	0.147	0.147

$^{+}p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OLS ordinary least squares, *M* model, *MENA* Middle East and Europe, *SES* socioeconomic status, *ISEI* International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status

Table 3 Full results for German identification in the Muslim sample, estimating the attitudes of Muslim youths toward Jews (pooled OLS with school fixed effects and robust standard errors)

	M1	M2
German identification	0.282**	0.252***
	(0.085)	(0.064)
Boy (reference: girl)	–	–0.281***
	–	(0.073)
Turkey (reference: Europe)	–	–0.645***
	–	(0.192)
MENA	–	–0.533*
	–	(0.249)
Other	–	–0.418
	–	(0.453)
Age	–	0.060
	–	(0.044)
SES (ISEI)	–	0.001
	–	(0.004)
Number of books	–	0.092*
	–	(0.044)
Intercept	1.592***	1.192^{+}
	(0.124)	(0.685)
Number of observations	507	507
R^2	0.112	0.153

$^{+}p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OLS ordinary least squares, *M* model, *MENA* Middle East and North Africa, *SES* socioeconomic status, *ISEI* International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status

Table 4 Full results for origin identification, estimating the attitudes of Muslim youths toward Jews (pooled OLS with school fixed effects and robust standard errors)

	M1	M2
Origin identification	–0.310***	–0.305***
	(0.081)	(0.072)
Boy (reference: girl)	–	–0.290***
	–	(0.079)
Turkey (reference: Europe)	–	–0.666***
	–	(0.169)
MENA	–	–0.466*
	–	(0.235)
Other	–	–0.356
	–	(0.508)
Age	–	0.046
	–	(0.044)
SES (ISEI)	–	–0.002
	–	(0.004)
Number of books	–	0.116^{+}
	–	(0.060)
Intercept	3.058***	2.830**
	(0.275)	(0.888)
Number of observations	507	507
R^2	0.097	0.145

$^{+}p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OLS ordinary least squares, *M* model, *MENA* Middle East and North Africa, *SES* socioeconomic status, *ISEI* International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status

Table 5 Full results for religious identification, estimating the attitudes of Muslim youths toward Jews (pooled OLS with school fixed effects and robust standard errors)

	M1	M2
Religious identification	–0.485***	–0.465***
	(0.090)	(0.068)
Boy (reference: girl)	–	–0.301***
	–	(0.088)
Turkey (reference: Europe)	–	–0.601***
	–	(0.178)
MENA	–	–0.374
	–	(0.250)
Other	–	–0.323
	–	(0.465)
Age	–	0.056
	–	(0.040)
SES (ISEI)	–	–0.001
	–	(0.005)
Number of books	–	0.120*
	–	(0.056)
Intercept	3.816***	3.285***
	(0.336)	(0.647)
Number of observations	507	507
R^2	0.111	0.157

$^{+}p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OLS ordinary least squares, *M* model, *MENA* Middle East and North Africa, *SES* socioeconomic status, *ISEI* International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status

Table 6 Full results for frequency of praying, estimating the attitudes of Muslim youths toward Jews (pooled OLS with school fixed effects and robust standard errors)

	M1	M2
Frequency of praying	–0.071*	–0.087*
	(0.035)	(0.041)
Boy (reference: girl)	–	–0.269**
	–	(0.096)
Turkey (reference: Europe)	–	–0.640***
	–	(0.184)
MENA	–	–0.368
	–	(0.264)
Other	–	–0.187
	–	(0.480)
Age	–	0.067^{+}
	–	(0.040)
SES (ISEI)	–	0.000
	–	(0.005)
Number of books	–	0.135**
	–	(0.052)
Intercept	2.283***	1.663**
	(0.138)	(0.621)
Number of observations	507	507
R^2	0.086	0.137

$^{+}p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OLS ordinary least squares, *M* model, *MENA* Middle East and North Africa, *SES* socioeconomic status, *ISEI* International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status

Table 7 Full results for mosque attendance, estimating the attitudes of Muslim youths toward Jews (pooled OLS with school fixed effects and robust standard errors)

	M1	M2
Frequency of mosque attendance	–0.184***	–0.141**
	(0.036)	(0.049)
Boy (reference: girl)	–	–0.220*
	–	(0.092)
Turkey (reference: Europe)	–	–0.572**
	–	(0.194)
MENA	–	–0.364
	–	(0.269)
Other	–	–0.307
	–	(0.522)
Age	–	0.053
	–	(0.041)
SES (ISEI)	–	0.000
	–	(0.005)
Number of books	–	0.131*
	–	(0.057)
Intercept	2.592***	1.929**
	(0.116)	(0.648)
Number of observations	507	507
R^2	0.101	0.139

$^{+}p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OLS ordinary least squares, *M* model, *MENA* Middle East and North Africa, *SES* socioeconomic status, *ISEI* International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status

Table 8 Full results for model including German, origin, and religious identification, estimating the attitudes of Muslim youths toward Jews (pooled OLS with school fixed effects and robust standard errors)

	(1)
German identification	0.266***
	(0.063)
Origin identification	–0.154
	(0.106)
Frequency of praying	0.002
	(0.079)
Frequency of mosque attendance	–0.042
	(0.110)
Religious identification	–0.369**
	(0.139)
Boy (reference: girl)	–0.278***
	(0.076)
Turkey (reference: Europe)	–0.557*
	(0.225)
MENA	–0.440^{+}
	(0.253)
Other	–0.351
	(0.402)
Age	0.042
	(0.049)
SES (ISEI)	–0.000
	(0.004)
Number of books	0.094*
	(0.042)
Intercept	3.423***
	(0.785)
Number of observations	507
R^2	0.189

$^{+}p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

OLS ordinary least squares, *MENA* Middle East and North Africa,*SES* socioeconomic status, *ISEI* International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status



Fig. 6 Correlations between national identification, origin identification, religious identification, frequency of praying, and mosque attendance among Muslim youths

Author Contributions All authors contributed equally to the manuscript.

Data Availability The data are available upon application from https://doi.org/10.34882/dezim.fis.download.1.1.0. The code underlying this study is openly accessible at https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/ZDCGA.

Declarations

Conflict of interest C. Czymara and L. Leszczensky declare that they have no competing interests.

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